We consider a unionised oligopoly in which firms choose between vertical integration (VI) and international outsourcing (OS) part of the vertical chain. Domestic labour is unionised while foreign labour is not. Final good production uses an intermediate which can be produced in house or outsourced to a foreign supplier. The intermediate requires an investment in quality. Under OS, the foreign supplier makes a relationship specific investment in developing the intermediate good. We show that if marginal cost are higher under OS, firms' mode of operation choice involves a trade off between this and the higher fixed cost associated with VI.
Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that international outsourcing can be used by firms to weaken trade unions and that strong unions make outsourcing more attractive. However, it is also argued that outsourcing reduces costs. If so, then it ought to enable unions to extract higher wages at the remaining stages of production.
In this paper we examine how the strategic interaction between firms and the relative strength of firms and unions determine the effects of unionisation on the incentive to outsource and the effect of outsourcing on investment and firms' efficiency. 1 We build on Montagna (2007 and Under VI, unionisation reduces the incentive to invest as part of the additional rent generated by the investment is captured by the union. However, we show that an attempt to escape from this problem by outsourcing may not lead to more investment (and hence to a lower marginal production cost): the RSI made by the supplier will typically result in an underinvestment in the quality of the intermediate and hence to an increase in marginal cost for the downstream firm. In addition, upstream outsourcing paradoxically increases the aggressiveness of the domestic unions (which bid up the wage) in the downstream sector. The intuition is that the union knows that the wage it 1 Lommerud et al (2009) analyse how the incentive to outsource is influenced by unionisation within a partial equilibrium monopolistically competitive framework. Skaksen (2004) studies the implications of the potential of international outsourcing on union wages within a general equilibrium framework in which the decision to outsource occurs after union-firm wage negotiations. Koskela and Schöb (2008) analyse the effects of labour market reforms on the decision to outsource of unionise firms. A related, earlier, literature studies the effects of unionisation on the decision to do FDI: e.g. Zhao (1995) , Bughin and Vannini (1995) , Leahy and Montagna (2000) . 2 Montagna (2007 and ) combine oligopolistic interaction with relationship specific investment frameworks of outsourcing as developed, in endogenous mode of operation models, by e.g. Grossman and Helpman (2002 and others. Shy and Stenbacka (2003) look at outsourcing under oligopoly but without relationship specific investment. sets has less impact on the labour demanded by the firm as the impact of domestic wages on home marginal cost is relatively less important when the firm outsources part of its production abroad, because reliance on domestic labour is lower. As a result, the per-unit rent for the workers still employed by the firm is higher, even though the total labour rent extracted from this firm may well be lower. This arises from a complementarity between foreign and domestic employment under OS that is due to the complementarity between upstream and downstream activities. The net result of this is that OS is likely to lead to an increase in the marginal production cost of the downstream firm, even if there are substantial underlying cost advantages of the foreign supplier in producing the intermediate. Other things equal, downstream unionisation reduces the incentive of firms to outsource upstream production abroad. If marginal cost are higher under OS, firms' mode of operation choice involves a trade off between this and the higher fixed cost associated with VI.
We also consider the possibility of outsourcing production of the final good.
Outsourcing both upstream and downstream activities allows the firms to escape the negative effects of unionisation on the returns from OS. However, depending on the precise 'structure' of OS one source of rent extraction behaviour (i.e. by the union) may be simply replaced by another (i.e. by the foreign downstream producer).
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. The game is solved in Section 3 and the equilibrium regimes are discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We consider a market in which there are two final goods firms that sell a homogenous good to an integrated market. 3 We further assume that sales to the final good market do not involve a transport cost. This assumption may reflect the fact that the destination market is located nearby, and/or that it is highly integrated -perhaps in a customs union -with the market where the firms are located, or else both firms may be located and selling in the same countries. The inverse demand is given by: The 'usefulness' of the intermediate to the final producer depends on the level of the investment in its quality and in customisation for the final good production. We will assume that K z = , where K is investment in design (quality and customisation). Thus, there are diminishing returns to investment. This is a plausible assumption and one that is needed to ensure an interior solution. Using the superscripts V and O to denote vertical integration and outsourcing respectively, marginal production cost for firm i will thus be:
if the firm outsources its intermediate, and
( )
if the firm is vertically integrated.
If firm i is vertically integrated, its profit function is given by:
where G represents the fixed governance cost that a vertically integrated firm is assumed to incur. On the other hand, if the firm chooses to outsource, its profit function will instead be:
When a firm chooses to outsource, it avoids both the investment costs and the governance cost of vertical integration. 5 The investment costs are now borne by an intermediate goods producer who has profits:
(4)
We will also use i to represent the southern upstream firm that has a bilateral 
The Game
The model is a four-stage game. In stage one, firms decide whether to outsource their intermediate or to produce it in-house at home. If they decide to outsource, they approach a specialised supplier firm, located somewhere in the South, which will produce the intermediate. In stage two, the firms invest in the development of the intermediate. If the downstream firms opts for outsourcing, then the specialised supplier firms undertakes the investment. In stage three, the firms bargain with their firm-specific union over the wage and (if they outsource) they simultaneously bargain with the intermediate supplier over the price of the intermediate. 6 We assume that the final good producer only has enough time to negotiate with a single supplier. As in Grossman and Helpman (2003) , should bargaining breakdown, the producer will not have sufficient time to produce the intermediate itself, and so will exit the marketwhile the supplier will have wasted its investment. In stage four, firms produce the final output.
As the game is solved by backward induction we begin by discussing the final stage and then working back.
Stage 4
In the final stage of the game the two firms engage in Cournot competition with outputs determined by maximising operating profits ( )
since at this stage all fixed and investment costs have been sunk. The first-order conditions given by:
where (h=O,V) and (i=1,2). Combining the reaction functions implied by the first order conditions in (5) with the inverse demand function in (1) we obtain the (final-stage) Nash equilibrium in quantities:
where (h,k=O,V) and (i,j=1,2) with (i≠j). 
Stage 3
In stage three of the game firms will bargain over the wage with the unions and (if they outsource) they will simultaneously bargain with their supplier firm over the price of the intermediate 7 . If the firm is vertically integrated, then all the labour employed in its activities (assembly as well intermediate good production) is employed in-house. If it outsources, the firm's labour demand will only be made up of the workers employed in the production of the final good.
Firm i's firm-specific union's utility function is given by:
where w is the reservation wage of the union and h
are the firm level per-unit employment in the two regimes. 8 We assume that the monopoly union sets the wage maximising equation (7). Recall that all fixed and investment costs are sunk at this stage. Hence, treats h i ξ as a constant and thus sets w i such that:
Hence, regardless of the mode of operation chosen by the firm, we can write:
From (2) and (6) we can obtain
. This shows that the greater is the per-unit input requirement of unionised labour, the greater is the (negative) impact on the firm's output and operating profits of an increase in wage. Combining this with (9) we obtain:
7 The purchase of intermediate components is sometimes assumed to involve the combination of a fixed lump-sum payment and a price set at marginal cost. As highlighted by Spencer (2005) , however, the transfer of rents through lump-sum payments is at odds with stylised facts about domestic and international transactions. Our paper recognizes that outsourcing contracts typically involve strictly positive prices that exceed marginal costs. The distribution of rents between intermediate supplier and final good producer -and hence the return for relationship specific investment -is determined through Nash bargaining over the price after investment is sunk. 8 We assume that employment and wages have the same weights in the unions' utility functions. One could easily allow for different weights, but this would not yield many additional insights in this context.
Hence, unions will moderate their wage claims more the greater is the per-unit input requirement of unionised labour. The implication of this is that under outsourcing unions are, other things equal, less restrained in their wage demand. This result goes against conventional wisdom -which contends that outsourcing weakens the rent extraction ability of unions. 9
Now, using the wage equation in (10), the marginal costs are:
if it is vertically integrated. We assume that if firm i outsources, then the price q i of the intermediate good is set by the intermediate producer. 10 The upstream producer chooses q i to maximise expression (4) taking the level of investment as given. This yields:
Stage 2
The firms choose their investment levels simultaneously in stage 2. If the intermediate is produced in-house then K i is chosen to maximise
been eliminated using (6) and i K has been eliminated using 2 i i z K = . We can model the firm as choosing the level of cost reduction: z i . This simplifies the algebra somewhat.
The resulting first-order condition is:
which implies:
. It will prove convenient to write this as:
9 One way to interpret this is that when the firm outsources, the union realises that increasing its wage has less of an impact on the firm and hence becomes more aggressive in its wage setting; for a similar result in a different context, see Skaksen and Sörensen (2001) . 10 It is straightforward to assume that, as in Montagna (2007 and , the intermediate price is determined by Nash bargaining between the upstream and downstream firms. 
. This expression for optimal investment is obviously similar to that in which firm i is vertically integrated. It differs only in that the right-hand side is now multiplied by 3/2. We can write it in compact form as:
The , thus the investment-to-output ratio is higher under outsourcing than vertical integration. This arises from the fact that the vertically integrated firm must share the returns from its investment with the unions. Under outsourcing, the upstream firm retains a greater share of the returns from investment than a downstream firm under outsourcing does. The reason for this is that the upstream party in the bilateral relationship -whether it be the upstream supplier or the union -that captures the lion's share of the return from any investment. This would seem to suggest that marginal costs would be lower under outsourcing, due to a higher input quality. However this is not the end of the story, because under outsourcing the firm is now suffering from the effects of rent extracting behaviour of two parties rather than one: the unions (on the remaining level of employment) and the upstream supplier. Hence, the marginal cost under outsourcing may still be higher than under vertical integration -despite a higher investment-to-output ratio. Comparing this result with those obtained in Montagna (2007 and , it is then clear that the unionisation alters the channels through which outsourcing affects a firm's cost.
Stage 1
The firms simultaneously choose their mode of operation in stage 1 of the game. To establish whether a firm will outsource or choose to be vertically integrated, we must compare its profits under the two regimes for a given behaviour of its rival. To this end, it proves useful to obtain expression for the profits in terms of outputs and parameters only. By using the first-order conditions for output in (5) and the expressions for optimal investment (14), in (3a), we can rewrite the profit function under vertical integration as:
Using (5) in (3b), the profit function under outsourcing can be rewritten similarly as:
It is immediately obvious from (16) and (17) . The term in square bracket is less than unity and so if outsourcing results in an increase in output then it dominates vertical integration.
Effects of the mode of operation on wages and union rents
Before proceeding to analyse the mode of operation equilibria in the following section, it is useful to expand on the implications of firms' mode of operation on equilibrium wages and union rents.
Note that the greater is the firm's profitability, the higher is the rent extraction ability of the union. If a change in the mode of operation choice increases the downstream firm's operating profits then this will lead to higher total union rents. It is clear from equation (10) 
The Mode of Operation Equilibria
We turn now to a discussion of the mode of operation equilibria. We begin in subsection 4.1 with what we will call the "base case" in which the firms are ex-ante symmetric and furthermore there is no underlying cost advantage or disadvantage from outsourcing. The lack of an underlying cost advantage from , where the parameter φ can be thought of as the pre-investment cost advantage of firm 1 under vertical integration.
The base case
When firms are ex-ante symmetric and there is no underlying cost advantage from outsourcing, it can be shown that the marginal cost is higher under outsourcing than under vertical integration. This is despite the higher investment-to-output ratio under outsourcing that we explained in Section 3 and arises from the countervailing effects of the double source of rent-extraction (from both unions and upstream supplier) in the case of outsourcing, as against the single source under vertical integration.
In the base case, it can be shown that the pattern of equilibria depends on the level of governance cost, G. If G is sufficiently large, then both firms will choose to outsource. While at G=0 The emergence of asymmetric equilibria can be explained by the existence of a negative interdependence between the firm's mode of operation decisions. Here outsourcing is a higher marginal cost (in exchange for lower fixed cost) and hence a lower output strategy. This is because of the greater aggressiveness of domestic unions in the presence of outsourcing plus the additional rent extracting activity of the upstream firm. The relative incentive to choose vertical integration is larger the larger is one's expected output. A firm that faces a vertically integrated rival has, ceteris paribus, a lower anticipated market share and hence a lower incentive to vertically integrate itself than a firm that faces an outsourced rival. Hence, over a range of G, vertical integration is a best response to a rival's outsourcing but outsourcing is a best response to a rival's vertical integration. This result is similar to that obtained in Leahy and Montagna (2009).
Cost advantages of outsourcing and trade liberalisation
In this subsection we again assume that the downstream firms are ex-ante symmetric and their prospective upstream partners are also ex-ante symmetric but we allow for the upstream and downstream firms to differ in their underlying costs, i.e. 
Cost asymmetries
So far we have assumed that the final goods firms are ex ante symmetric but it is interesting to examine the effects of underlying differences in firms for the propensity to outsource.
We find that ceteris paribus, the higher cost firms are the ones that are more likely to choose to outsource. In Figure 2 As is clear from the figure, the region of (V,O) in which the first firm is vertically integrated while the, now higher cost, second firm outsources gets larger in φ. These results are consistent with many others obtained in the literature -including those in Montagna (2007 and in an oligopoly setting and those obtained by Antrás and Helpman (2004) in a general equilibrium monopolistic competition settingand support existing empirical evidence that suggests that foreign outsourcers tend to be less productive than firms that invest abroad (e.g. Tomiura, 2007) .
It is straightforward to show that when φ is sufficiently large, trade liberalisation will lead to increases in ρ and eventually move the equilibrium from (V,V) to (V,O) and then, at higher values of ρ , the equilibrium will be (O,O).
Concluding Remarks
We have used a unionised oligopoly model to examine how the strategic interaction between firms and between firms and unions determine the effects of unionisation on the incentive to outsource and the effect of outsourcing on investment and firms' efficiency. We found that, contrary to conventional wisdom, outsourcing can increase the aggressiveness of unions when not all unionised production tasks are outsourced.
The reason for this is that the impact of domestic wages on downstream marginal cost is relatively less important when the firm outsources part of its production abroad, because trade-off between this and the higher fixed governance cost associated with VI.
We showed that by reducing the relative cost of foreign outsourcing, trade liberalisation increases the degree of outsourcing. Depending on the level of governance costs, it can shift the equilibrium regime from one in which all firms vertically integrate to one in which all outsource via asymmetric equilibrium regimes. Since trade liberalisation involves regime shifts, we obtain non-monotonic responses of prices, outputs, wages and investment levels (and thus welfare) to a fall in trade costs -with locally counter-intuitive results.
We also showed that the relatively less productive firms are the ones that are more likely to choose the outsourcing approach and, in line with some earlier research, that outsourcing could be seen as a defensive business strategy. Combining (5) and (1) (14) and (15), it is clear that the optimal z is proportional to output: 
